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Letting the Candidates Own the Recount:
The 1962 Minnesota Gubernatorial Recount and
its Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota Supreme Court's order, declaring Gov. Andersen ... the
winner [of the 1962 gubernatorial election] ... has caused a backfire that has
echoed all the way to Washington. ... Three of the justices [that decided the
case] had been promoted by Gov. Andersen. ... They remained on the panel
and helped declare him elected.I
The above is an excerpt from an article that appeared in newspapers
throughout Minnesota regarding the disputed 1962 Minnesota gubernatorial
race. The article was published after the state high court reversed the initial
canvass of votes that had declared Karl Rolvaag the winner, and instead
issued a decision-split along perceived party lines-to declare Elmer
Andersen the winner. While this quote is specific to the Minnesota election,
the skepticism expressed towards the judiciary and its ability to resolve a
disputed election impartially is nearly universal to all disputed elections.
Despite an inability to produce legitimacy or confidence, election law
repeatedly, if not exclusively, turns to the courts to resolve disputed
elections. Implicit in these arguments is that no other system, much less one
that embraces alternative dispute resolution (ADR) can successfully resolve
the such important events. This recent development questions this paradigm
and asserts that ADR can be-and has been-successfully implemented to
resolve elections.
Specifically, this comment reexamines the 1962 Minnesota gubernatorial
election as an unplanned, but highly successful use of ADR to resolve a
disputed election. While it may be unusual to consider a 1962 election
worthy of a comment, the election holds new importance as the fields of
election law and alternative dispute resolution find new synergies. An
* This comment was originally conceived during the 2011 Ohio State Journal on
Dispute Resolution Symposium, "Talking the Vote: Facilitating Disputed Election
Processes through ADR" after the election was briefly discused by a panel member. The
comment was then first drafted as a seminar paper for class on disputed elections. The
class was taught by Professor Edward Foley at The Ohio State University Moritz College
of Law. That paper has been revised to its current form as a comment for JDR.
1 Drew Pearson, Minnesota Supreme Court Comes Under Fire, THE BELL
SYNDICATE, Dec. 7, 1962, available at
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/49639/bl 7f23-1207zdisplay.pdf.
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election once viewed as an anomaly2 now provides insight as to how ADR
can be used in disputed elections. In fact, the impetus for this comment began
during the 2011 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution Symposium,
"Talking the Vote: Facilitating Disputed Election Processes through ADR."
During the symposium, one of the panelists suggested that the 1962 election
may be an example of one time that ADR was used to resolve a disputed
election. Despite this passing comment, the election has been ignored by
legal scholars generally, 3 and ADR scholars specifically. This recent
development seeks to reintroduce the 1962 disputed election as an example
of how ADR can be used to resolve a disputed election.
Perhaps contributing to the lack of ADR scholarship on the topic is the
fortuitous manner that the ADR techniques were used. The disputed 1962
Minnesota election began with a traditional challenge to the state Supreme
Court. When the high court's decision was met with such animosity by
Minnesotans, the press, and the parties involved, the candidates and the high
court decided the subsequent recount would not be presided by the court.
Eschewing the formal court system and legal precedent, the parties decided
the recount would be officiated by an independent three-judge panel. Even
more significantly, the two candidates mutually picked the three judges
presiding over the case and determined which ballots would be contested.
When the recount case concluded, the three-judge panel unanimously
concluded that Rolvaag-not Andersen-won. Andersen did not appeal. The
newspapers, which earlier had dismissed the recount as partisan, declared
that Minnesota had found a fair way to resolve a disputed election.4
To reassess the 1962 Minnesota gubernatorial election, this paper first
explores the precedent and circumstances that led the participants to pursue
this unusual form of dispute resolution. Next, the article examines the ADR
techniques used and how the candidates and public responded to an unusual
process. While this comment focuses on how ADR techniques were used, it
is beyond the scope of this article to define the ADR techniques used as
specific forms of ADR such as arbitration or negotiation. At the time, none of
the parties specifically asserted that they were using ADR techniques. Thus,
2 See Elizabeth Stawicki, The Origin of the Three-Judge Panel, MPR NEWS, Jan. 25,
2009, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/01/25/threejudgesidebar/ (last
visited Feb. 17, 2012).
3 The only legal scholarship on the election has been conducted by Professor
Edward B. Foley. See Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation ofElectoral Errors:
Theory, Practice, and Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 350 (2007).
4 Interview by Marvin Roger Anderson with Oscar R. Knutson, Minnesota State
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it would be ahistorical to state that the parties engaged in techniques such as
arbitration without fully defining the methods and comparing them to what
actually happened in 1962. Such an analysis, however, is important and may
warrant additional scholarship on the election.
The article demonstrates that the three-judge panel was not created from
statute, legal precedent, or the parties' desires to resolve the dispute fairly.
Instead, the two candidates and the Minnesota Supreme Court Chief Justice
pursued a three-judge panel based on their own interests. Each candidate
believed it would help him win the recount and the Supreme Court wanted to
restore confidence in the judicial system. Thus each had a reason to work
outside the established legal framework and use ADR techniques. Despite
starkly different interests, the parties produced a three-judge panel and a
process that fairly and independently oversaw the recount. In fact, the
recount succeeded because the parties incorporated ADR into the process.
Both candidates were forced to resolve the disputed election themselves. As
a result, the candidates and public viewed the decision as fair and no appeal
was cast.5
II. BACKGROUND TO THE 1962 ELECTION
Although the 1962 election was resolved creatively through alternative
dispute resolution, the 1962 gubernatorial campaign began less
ceremoniously. The election started as an uninspired partisan contest
5 Central to this article is the book Recount by Ronald Stinnett and Charles H.
Backstrom. RONALD STINNETT AND CHARLES BACKSTROM, RECOUNT (1964). RECOUNT is
the definitive work devoted to analyzing the 1962 Minnesota election. Consequently, the
book is cited frequently to understand the disputed elections chronology. However, while
RECOUNT focuses on telling the recount as it unfolded, this article focuses more on the
circumstances that allowed the parties to use alternative dispute resolution processes and
reactions the public had to the recount. As a result, Stinnett's book is used in two
distinctly different ways. First, RECOUNT is used as a rich source of otherwise unavailable
newspaper articles, polls, and interviews. As the election's own archive, RECOUNT
provides a rich way to understand the election historically. When possible, other sources
are used to corroborate Stinnett's comprehensive objective analysis of the election. The
book's second use is more instrumental to this article. Stinnett began researching
RECOUNT almost immediately after the election concluded. In fact, the book would be
published before Minnesota would elect its next governor. In this regard, Stinnett's own
analysis of "fairness" contributes to this article by understanding how Minnesotans-
including Stinnett-perceived the election in its immediate aftermath. In these instances,
RECOUNT shifts from being an academic account to becoming a primary source itself.
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between two career politicians: Elmer Andersen, the Republican, and Karl
Rolvaag, the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (DFL) candidate. 6
Andersen, the incumbent, described himself as a "party man" who was
committed to advancing the Republican Party's goals.7 Although he refrained
from calling himself a career politician,8 Andersen represented the party for
twenty-six years in roles as a campaign aide, a congressional campaign
manager, a presidential campaign manager, and a five-session member of the
state senate. 9
Perhaps because of his extensive bureaucratic background, Andersen's
term as governor was often criticized as being more attentive to the processes
of passing legislation' 0 and to fostering a positive image of public service, 1
than it was to was creating change and providing a more inspirational vision
for Minnesota. 12 Andersen, in his autobiography, conceded that his interest in
legislative process may have slowed his initiatives and hurt his cross-party
appeal.13 However, to Republicans, he performed competently to earn the
nomination as the party's gubernatorial candidate.14
Andersen's polarizing effect on voters was made apparent when
Minnesotans elected him the state's thirtieth governor in 1960. Out of a total
of 1,577,509 votes cast, Andersen had won the governorship by 22,879
votes.' 5 Although this election is not the one at issue, it is interesting to note
6 DFL stands for Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party. The DFL is a state party and is
considered a part of the Democratic Party.
7 ELMER L. ANDERSEN, I TRUST To BE BELIEVED 13 (2004).
8 ELMER L. ANDERSEN, A MAN'S REACH 111 (2000) ("[Eleanor and I] did not take
long to decide we did not want to make a living at politics. we We wanted our political
activity to be public service, not a career.. .when When elected official officials make
governmental service a career, they lose a great deal of freedom and flexibility." But see
id. at 177 (One could not serve five session of the Minnesota Legislature and not stay
"attuned to pubic affairs.")
9 See id. at 95-174.
10 Id. at 226-28 (describing his numerous calls to help a girl who had developed a
relationship with a bus driver and also his pursuit of several pet projects); see also To BE
BELIEVED, supra note 7, at 30 (describing the role of government in a campaign speech);
STINNETT, supra note 5, at 6 (quoting a newspaper article describing Andersen as a
slower moving leader that liked to consider and weigh evidence and opinions from a wide
variety of people).
11 See, e.g., A MAN's REACH, supra note 8, at 228-32 (interrupting any meeting to
talk to children and seeing his role as a promoter of Minnesota's universities).
12 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 6.
13 A MAN'S REACH, supra note 8, at 235.
14 Id. at 233-34.
15 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 11.
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how close it was. In addition, election night was the pinnacle of Andersen's
popularity as a governor. For his entire two-year term, Andersen's approval
ratings never exceeded 50%.16 In fact, a poll taken one year before the 1962
election revealed that only 37% of Minnesotans planned to vote for him, 49%
planned to vote against him, and 11% had no opinion. Andersen failed to
achieve crossover support from DFLers or independents.
The polarizing governor's challenger in 1962 was the DFL candidate
Karl Rolvaag. Rolvaag's career reflected his Republican counterpart. A
longtime DFL party activist, Rolvaag sought the governorship as the sitting
lieutenant governor, a post he had held since 1954.17 Prior to serving as
lieutenant governor, Rolvaag worked as the DFL state party chairman.18
Rolvaag's stoic and reserved nature caused observers to respect his ability to
analyze complex issues, but also criticize his inability to connect with
voters. 19
Thus, when the two candidates entered the 1962 election, it was clear
that neither would win the contest convincingly. Both appealed to their bases
but did little to attract independent voters.20 In addition, their backgrounds as
party leaders led each to tout issues that related to taxes and government
spending instead of sweeping ideological change or government reform.21
Finally, both men were relatively known commodities in Minnesota. They
had each run for statewide office on several occasions and voters already had
a developed understanding as to each candidate's values.
For what the campaign lacked in terms of candidate interest, it made up
for in perceived closeness as the race tightened. The New York Times listed
Minnesota's gubernatorial race as one of the five close races to watch 22 and
polls taken several months before the election found the race to be in a dead
heat.23 The dead heat even prompted a late campaign visit from President
John F. Kennedy, who asserted he traveled 1,500 miles from Boston "not just
16 Id. at 13.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Minnesota Liberal: Karl FritjofRolvaag, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 26, 1963, at 10.
20 However, Andersen attracts a majority of the Independent voters. See STINNETT,
supra note 5, at 35.
21 Minnesota Liberal: Karl FritjofRolvaag, supra note 19.
22 Minnesota Historical Society, 1963 Andersen-Rolvaag Election Recount, Podcast.,
http://discussions.mnhs.org/collections/2010/11/1 963-andersen-rolvaag-election-recount-
2/ (last visited April 6, 2011) (containing excerpts from Kennedy's speech).
23 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 35.
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for the bean supper but because I want to see this state elect [Rolvaag] the
next governor." 24
Despite claims of a heated campaign, 25 signs of visible antipathy did not
develop until the week leading up to the election. 26 Rolvaag accused
Andersen of speeding up construction of a highway system so that Andersen
could have a ribbon-cutting ceremony several days before the election.27
Rolvaag claimed, wrongly, that Andersen's insistence on finishing the
highway resulted in numerous structural defects. 28 Andersen denied the
allegations. However, this end-of-campaign dispute has been credited with
ensuring an extremely close election.29
This background is significant for several reasons. First, neither
candidate was a statesman. Some histories of the election attempt to portray
the two men as friendly candidates that worked together in an era where
public service was an honor and compromise a necessity.30 It was because of
this commitment to working together that the two candidates were able to
compromise and conduct a fair recount. However, this mischaracterizes the
two candidates and the campaign. The two men were politicos. Andersen
considered Rolvaag a disloyal lieutenant governor who was more consumed
with his political career than the state's interests.31 If Rolvaag held Andersen
in any regard, it was diminished by the highway controversy, where Rolvaag
personally attacked Andersen's involvement. Nothing in the men's
backgrounds or experiences suggested they would work together to resolve
the disputed election. As is later argued, the two men were more driven by
tactical decisions to win than any background or reverent view of public
service.
24 Id; see also STINNETT, supra note 5, at 11-37 (characterizing the campaign as
more spirited).
25 See generally STINNETT, supra note 5.
26 A Bitterly Fought Race, BRAINERD DAILY DISPATCH, Feb. 5, 1963, at 11.
27 See, e.g., Looking Back to Another Protracted Minnesota Race: 1962,
MINNPOST.COM (Nov. 11, 2008),
http://www.minnpost.com/iricnathanson/2008/11/11/4528/looking back-toanother prot
racted minnesota race 19 (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
28 A MAN'S REACH, supra note 8, at 241.
29 Looking Back to Another Protracted Minnesota Race: 1962, supra note 27.
30 See generally STINNETT, supra note 5 (portraying the two men as leaders
committed to a fair process).
31 Elizabeth Stawicki, The Origin of the Three-Judge Panel, MPR NEWS (Jan. 25,
2009), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/01/25/threejudgesidebar/ (last
visited Feb. 17, 2012).
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Second, both candidates expected a close race. Each candidate pursued a
political campaign that relied on his respective constituents and it was
understood that whoever could get out his supporters would win.32 in
addition, each candidate was aware of the close gubernatorial election in
1960 and the polls that showed the race in a dead heat.
III. ELECTION DAY 33
On Nov. 6, the election polls closed at eight in the evening, but neither
candidate expected the race to be declared that evening. Per Minnesota's
election code, after polls closed poll workers immediately canvassed the vote
by counting the paper ballots and reporting the results after the initial canvass
was completed. 34 However, the canvass results did not come in immediately
because many precincts did not have voting machines. As a result, the vote
results came in a series of phases resulting in what political scientist Ronald
Stinnett describes as a phase35, or swinging pendulum. Each phase or swing
tended to favor one party or the other and as a result the "leading" candidate
would change frequently. 36 In the first phase, Minnesota's large cities
reported almost immediately, which would tend to show the DFL candidate
having a large lead. In the second phase, the rural precinct reports came in
the late night and early morning hours, tending to swing the election back to
the Republican candidate. In the third phase, the "Iron Range" vote came in
from Northern Minnesota, where the DFL candidate got his or her last surge
of votes. In the last phase, towns that used paper ballots reported results.
These votes tended to vote Republican. In close elections, it was nearly
impossible to know the winner until these votes were tabulated.
The same process occurred in 1962, but with even greater swings. 37
Rolvaag emerged with a strong early lead of 29,000 votes buoyed by the city
32 Stinnett makes the same argument. STINNETT, supra note 5, at 34 ("[T]he general
public looked upon Rolvaag and Andersen impassively and could not get overly excited
in either support or opposition of either man ... Each [candidate] was burdened with the
problem of presenting a positive picture of himself to a public which continued to voiced
disapproval of Andersen's performance during his two years as governor but which
demonstrate indifference to Rolvaag.").
33 This section relies extensively on Stinnett for a recap of the day's events. See
generally STINNETT, supra note 5.
34 Minn. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 204.19 (West 1962) (since amended).
35 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 60.
36 r
37 See Four Governor Races may be Hung up Weeks, CHI. DAILY TRB., Nov. 10,
1962, at N6.
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vote. However, by midnight his lead started to erode as rural votes were
counted. By five the next morning, the lead switched and Andersen pulled
ahead by 15,000 votes. This lead switch would be the first of six that would
occur over the next five days. While the initial swings in the election would
be measured by thousands of votes, the subsequent changes would be much
smaller. On Wednesday evening, Rolvaag would retake the lead by 115. On
Thursday afternoon, Andersen would regain the lead by 609 votes, only to
have Rolvaag regain an 89-vote lead two hours later. Friday morning brought
Andersen back into the lead by 44 votes. Saturday would see the final lead
switch, as Rolvaag won the unofficial canvass by 139 votes. In an election of
1,267,502 votes, Rolvaag had won by the initial canvass .07% of the vote.38
Contributing to the delay and greater swings, several precincts had
problems tabulating votes. A snowstorm in Northern Minnesota delayed the
counting of key DFL votes. 39 Additionally, several districts reported errors in
the canvassing. While it is not known if such errors commonly occurred, it is
clear that a correction of fifty votes did not usually change the election's
outcome, making such final swings unusually critical.40 Despite these delays,
Minnesota was not the only state with a race still undetermined. In fact,
Minnesota was one of several prominent races that remained too close to call
several days after the election.41 However, none of the outstanding races
would be as close as Minnesota's race, nor would they result in a protracted
dispute.
Because both candidates anticipated a long counting process, neither
called for the other to concede. 42 In fact, as both parties realized the election
would remain close, their attorneys began familiarizing themselves with
Minnesota's election codes to consider how they could contest the initial
results or ask for a recount. This proved challenging as Minnesota's election
statutes had been modified two years earlier. Initially, both parties focused on
the authority of the county canvassing boards to challenge the results.43
Minnesota's election code provided that the board meet within ten days of
38 This provides a summary of the election returns. For a more in-depth discussion,
see STINNETr, supra note 5, at 57-65.
39 Id. at 63; Minnesota Race Still in Doubt as Snowstorm Delays Counting; Snow
Delays Report, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1962, at 43.
40 STINNETT, supra note 5.
41 Four Governor Races may be Hung up Weeks, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 10, 1962,
at N6.
42 A MAN'S REACH, supra note 8, at 246.
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the general election and publicly canvass the vote.4 The meeting served as a
way to authenticate the initial canvass before certifying the election.
However, a 1955 amendment granted the canvassing board authority not only
to tabulate the votes, but also to declare errors in the vote counting:
If, in conducting the canvass of votes at any election... any county
canvassing board determines by a four-fifths' vote that an obvious error in
the counting and recording of the vote...has been made by the judges in any
precincts, then the county canvassing board shall refuse to count the returns
of that precinct for that office, and they shall order an inspection of the
ballots and the returns of the precinct for the purpose of correcting the
obvious error.45
These provisions essentially gave the canvassing board the power to
review the votes before certifying if the board found an "obvious error." 6 If
an error was found while reviewing the ballots, the county canvassing board
appeared to have the power to correct the error and submit a proper vote
total. 7 Such actions did not need to be initiated by either of the candidates.
Instead, it was a step in the process to certifying the original election.
However, the statute was relatively new and untested. The statute did not
specifically define an "obvious error" and a comment to the statute failed to
give much guidance, stating only that if a board found an "obvious error," it
could correct errors in the initial count.49 In practice, the boards did not know
what an obvious error was either. Stinnett contends the county boards viewed
their role as ceremonial and that few had ever been asked to find an obvious
error. 50 An exhaustive search for a source to define the word, as it was
understood in 1962, revealed only one authority. An attorney general's
opinion from the previous year provided that an obvious error could be "a
44Id





49 Id. (Interim Commission Comment, 1959) (this comment came from the
commission that considered reviewing or amending the statute in 1959. The Commission
choose to leave the statute unchanged because the issue had not been regulated.).
50 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 67.
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situation where the total votes cast for one office exceeded the total number
of voters in the precinct." 51
Equally unclear is what would happen if an obvious error was
discovered. There were no clear remedies to resolve the dispute. For
example, if the vote exceeded the total number of ballots cast, how would the
parties correct the obvious error? Retabulating the votes may have brought
the vote count below the total votes in the precinct. However, if ballot box
stuffing had occurred, retabulating the ballots could still have generated a
total vote greater than the total number of eligible voters. Although the
statute considered this scenario as an obvious error, it did not say how parties
should proceed. In this scenario, should the canvassing board submit the vote
total or should the canvassing board disqualify all the ballots? The statute
12
provided no guidance for such a scenario.
Despite the statute's lack of clarity, or perhaps because of it, both parties
sought to use the canvassing board's power to find "obvious errors" to nudge
the vote totals before each county submitted its results.53 Once all the
counties submitted their totals, the State Canvassing Board would certify the
count. Because of this unique "obvious error" process, each candidate
viewed the county boards as an informal way to challenge the ballot totals
without having to actually litigate the election or ask for a recount.54
In addition, both candidates assumed that if a vote count could be
"corrected" by the board before the vote was certified, the election could be
won. Stinnett argues that this favored the certified winner in several ways.
First, it would cast the certified winner as the victor. Thus, the losing
candidate would have to overcome the public perception of having lost the
initial count. Second, by being certified, the candidate would not have to
pursue a recount. Because recounts were not automatic in 1962, the losing
candidate would have to request such an order. Thus by winning the initial
vote-with the help of the county canvassing boards-both candidates had a
much clearer path to victory.55
Although both candidates sought to find obvious errors, they sought to
cast a wide net over what an "obvious" error could be. 56 Stinnett describes
51 Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 64-b, (1961) (cited to in Minn. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 204.30
(West 1962)). There could be more to this opinion but only this example was provided in
the Annotated Statutes. The original version of the attorney general's opinion could not
be located.
52 See Minn. § 204.30 (West 1962).
53 See, e.g., STINNETr, supra note 5, at 72-73.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 68-69.
56 See generally id. at 66-79.
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that each party collected a variety of materials to create obvious error claims.
Both parties took photographs of the results from the initial canvass. 57 The
Republicans then used information such as precinct results and the number of
spoiled and defective ballots from each precinct to determine if a possible
obvious error existed.58 The Republicans even employed statisticians to
examine the results and determine irregular voting pattern to build up a
"book" of obvious errors.59 As a result, they did not challenge blindly or ask
counties to find if an error occurred. The candidates took proactive measures
to "help" the county boards find errors.
After finding the errors, the candidates proceeded to convince boards that
errors existed. Initially, it appears that Rolvaag benefited from finding
several early errors. However, as this occurred, Andersen and the
Republicans made a second and much more dramatic push to find errors
based on the reports from its statisticians. After identifying several key
precincts to find errors, the party was able to convince Republican-friendly
boards of the need to correct such errors.60 Thus, unlike the DFLers, who
made several initial challenges, the Republicans searched throughout the
state to find strategic vote gains.
However, the process become overtly political when the Republicans
began appealing to boards that had already certified their votes. Many local
boards had certified their elections before the ten-day window had closed.
Despite doing this, the Andersen campaign asked the boards to reexamine
their ballots and find any "obvious" errors before the ten-day window had
closed. In essence, the Republican party asked local boards to decertify their
returns, in which they had found no error previously, and now find an
obvious error that they had missed. As the trailing candidate, such a tactic
made sense for Andersen. Any vote "corrected" now would bring him closer
to victory and ensured that he would not have to challenge the votes in a
recount. Angered that the Republicans were having boards reopen vote totals,
the DFL countered by asserting that asking the boards to reexamine ballots
was illegal because the canvassing board already submitted their reports.
Despite these accusations, Andersen and the Republicans persuaded eleven
precincts to re-examine their certified ballots. Because of these efforts,
Andersen netted 200 votes and pulled into the lead.61
57 Id. at 69.
58 Id
59 STINNETT. supra note 5, at 69.
60 d at 69-71.
61 Id.
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This prompted the DFL, whose candidate was now losing, to respond in
two ways. 62 With its candidate trailing, the DFL now embraced the
Republican "reopening" tactic and pushed canvassing boards to reexamine
their results and find ballots for obvious errors. However, in an increasing
sign of the election's partisan divide, the Republicans pressured county
boards not to find any "obvious error."63 As a result, the DFL had trouble
finding sympathetic boards at this stage of the election and Rolvaag could
not regain the lead.
The DFL's next defense was to file for a restraining order in court. 64 This
marked the first time either party pursued legal action in the election. The
DFL requested a restraining order that would stop-and not count-county
board findings of obvious error decisions if the board had previously certified
its vote.65 A series of appeals led the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court,
which had the ultimate authority to decide whether the restraining order
should be granted. Despite this authority, the state high court did not respond
to this question directly. Instead, the court ruled that it would refrain from
deciding any election issue until the state board had certified all the results.
Since the State Canvassing Board could not meet until all the county boards
had submitted their certified results, the high court gave a very indirect but
clear answer: the precincts could to continue to find "obvious" errors even
after they had already certified their votes. This rejected the DFL's request,
let the 200 votes that the Republicans had found through obvious errors
could "stand" until the state board met, and gave the lead to Andersen.
In addition to giving Andersen the lead, the decision revealed the high
court's ideological split. The ruling came down on strictly partisan lines, with
the three conservative justices moving for errors to be counted, while the two
liberal justices voted to prohibit such counting.66
Because the court allowed the votes to be counted, Andersen regained
the lead after all the local boards submitted their results. With this process
complete, the candidates now waited for the State Canvassing Board to meet
and certify the results. In its meeting, the State Canvassing Board discussed
whether it should include the amended results. This decision differed from
the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling, because the State Canvassing Board
62 Id. at 71.
63 Id at 71-73.
64 Id. at 72-73.
65 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 70-75.
66 Two of the justices, Associate Justice Thomas Gallagher and Associate Justice
Martin A. Nelson, recused themselves because they had served on the state canvassing
board. Id. at 75.
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now had to determine if the amended returns should be counted in the
certified vote. Unlike the Supreme Court decision, the state board could not
punt to another court. The board knew the effects its decision would have. If
the board did not count the "obvious errors" Rolvaag would win by 58. If the
errors were counted, Andersen would win by 142. The state board choose the
latter and certified Andersen the winner and by 142. The decision was based
on a 3-2 split decision,67 with the three Republicans seeking to count
included ballots and the board's two DFL members seeking to not count the
votes.68 Although the election was certified, the board's decision was not
final. Rolvaag could appeal the decision to include the amended count to the
Minnesota Supreme Court. He did this immediately. 69
Unlike the first time the election came to the state high court, where the
Court declined to discuss the issue on how to count the "obvious errors," the
Minnesota Supreme Court now had to make a decision on whether to include
the votes by upholding or rejecting the State Canvassing Board's decision.
Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the board's inclusion of
the "obvious error" votes and declared Andersen the winner by the same
partisan split that the court had issued in its first opinion.70 The Court's
majority held that even though the local boards technically violated the
statute by certifying the results and then reopening them to find errors, it was
more important to ensure the results were accurate than to disenfranchise
voters.71 From afar, the Court's decision seemed well grounded in the
maxim: all votes should be counted. However, a closer analysis of the court's
ideological split and logical reasoning reveals a different conclusion.
First, the Court's decision was split based on the political ideologies of
its members. The Court ruled 3-2 in favor of counting the ballots and
certifying Andersen as the winner. The three justices who voted to count the
amended votes-and thus give Andersen the certified victory-were
appointed by Andersen. 72 Second, because the provision regarding "obvious
67 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 78.
68 The Boards' DFLers were Secretary of State Joseph L. Donovan and Associate
Justice Thomas F. Gallagher. The Board's Republican was Associate Justice Martin A.
Nelson, District Judge Albin S. Pearson, and District Judge Luther Sletten. As Stinnett
contends, the board was divided ideologically, but they were not usually involved in
deciding elections. Id. at 77. For a more in-depth discussion of the canvassing board's
hearing and decision, see id. at 75-79.
69 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 88.
70 In Re Application ofAndersen, 119 N.W.2d I (Minn. 1962).
71 Id. at 12.
72 A MAN'S REACH, supra note 8, at 221-23 (describing the process by which
Andersen appointed the three justices to the court); See also Drew Pearson, Minnesota
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error" was new, the holding failed to follow any clear precedent. By default,
the majority and minority opinions strayed from drafting convincing
arguments and instead rested their decisions on competing norms of vote-
counting.73 Both these election law norms coincidently benefited the
candidate that matched the justice's perceived ideology. Third, instead of
writing a restrained analysis, the majority opinion and the dissent used the
opinion to critique the opposing candidate. The dissent, drafted by a justice
that had been appointed by a DFL governor, challenged the result as a
"selective" recount that unfairly prejudiced one candidate, the candidate he
opposed.74 The court's majority openly attacked Rolvaag for first trying to
stop the canvass, then supporting the canvass, and then trying to litigate it.75
Far from a unanimous decision, the court's decision revealed a fractured
political divide.
Despite this controversy, the court seemed aloof as to how outwardly
political its statutory decision would appear and how openly it would be
criticized. The court recognized that it had to interpret the statute, but
believed it had legal cover because of the statute's vague procedural rules.
This is recognized in the majority's conclusion, where Chief Justice Knutson
wrote that the statute's complexity was why the State Canvassing Board had
been divided: "That there is difficulty in proper construction ... is evidenced
... [in that] the state canvassing board-composed of two district judges, two
members of this court, and the secretary of state, four of whom are learned in
the law-has been unable to agree on their proper application." 76
The press reacted differently. National commentators accused the
Minnesota Supreme Court of making a politically motivated decision.77
Stinnett, who otherwise praised the recount in his book, went so far as to say,
"[Whether] the individual decisions producing such a result were
coincidental or political was and is for each person to determine for
himself."78 Stinnett's account may have been the least critical. Another
newspaper wrote an editorial entitled, "Please Say it isn't True." 79 The
editorial stated that while it hoped the decision was not political, "[T]he
Supreme Court Under Fire, THE BELL SYNDICATE, Dec. 7, 1962 (insisting the three
justice appointed by Andersen should have recused themselves).
73 See generally in re Andersen, supra note 70.
74 Id. at 14.
75 Id. at 11.
76 Id. at 6.
77 See STINNETT, supra note 5, at 82-83 (describing press reactions).
7 8 Id. at 8 1.
79 Please Say It Isn't True, THE SUNDAY TRIB., Dec. 4, 1962, at 4.
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political maneuverings of the past month have left [the Minnesotan] in a sort
of state of shock, so that now, in spite of which candidate he cast his ballot
for, he doesn't care much who is governor."80 Nationally syndicated
columnist Drew Pearson asserted the decision "caused a backfire that has
echoed all the way to Washington," and that the decision was particularly
abhorrent because the entire three member majority owed their current
appointments to Andersen. 81
Was the issue hotly debated in Washington D.C., as Pearson claimed? It
remains unclear if Pearson actually encountered much debate about the
decision when he wrote the article. However, if the country was not aware of
the split decision before the article, it was after the article ran. Pearson's
column was syndicated throughout the country. His portrayal of the decision
as "political" was featured in newspapers as far west as California and as far
south as Louisiana.82 As a result, much of the country knew about the
election, solely for the high court's partisan decision.
At this stage, the recount became extremely polarizing. This contributed
to the perception that each party was interested in winning at all costs.83 In a
letter to the editor, a Minnesotan wrote that he was frustrated that the DFLers
were trying to block votes from being counted, then criticized Andersen for
trying to stall a recount when he was winning, but pushing for the recount to
be publicly funded when he was losing.84 Neither party was immune from
criticism and the state Supreme Court's newest ruling seemed only to
escalate tensions. Quickly the election's story devolved from being a unique,
extremely close election to an overtly partisan contest to steal the election.
One Minnesotan presciently asked the two parties to find a way to work out
the election, asking for the "two groups to get together and [decide] on a
recount procedure acceptable to both."85
80 d
81 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 92.
82 Unclear is how many newspapers published Pearson's column. Online searches
revealed that newspapers around the country carried his column. However, only
newspapers that had digitized their articles and made them available search could be
located. But see Gerry Nelson, Court Orders Andersen Certified as Governor: Order Sets
stage for Recount, WINONA DAILY NEWS, Nov. 21, 1962, at 1 (describing how Andersen
and Rovlaag both thought the results of the Court were fair).
83 Please Say It Isn't True, THE SUNDAY TRIB., Dec. 4, 1962, at 4.
84 For A Speedy Simple Recount, AUSTIN DAILY HERALD, Dec. 4, 1962, at 4.
85 Id.
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IV. THE RECOUNT
Despite being declared the loser, Rolvaag was not officially eliminated
from the race because he could pursue a recount.86 Every decision thus far
had only challenged the original results and did not constitute a formal
recounting of the votes. The recount provision was provided for in Section
209.03 of Minnesota's election code: "[a]ny voter, including any candidate,
may contest the nomination or election of any person for whom he had the
right to vote, who is ... elected to a state ... office."87 Significantly, the
recount had to be requested. Under no grounds would an automatic recount
be initiated.88 The voter could contest the election over three grounds: (1) an
irregularity in the conduct of the election, (2) an irregularity in the canvass of
the votes or (3) grounds of deliberate; serious; and material violations of the
provisions of the Minnesota election law.89 Any recount had to be requested
within ten days of the after the canvass had been completed. 90
In essence, any challenge to the original results only had to claim an
error existed. Perplexingly, the challenger did not need to prove an actual
error existed in the original count to justify a recount if he asserted an
irregularity in the canvass of the votes. Instead the challenger needed only to
assert that such error existed and that the challenger needed to recount the
votes to prove the validity of his or her irregular canvass claim. Thus, the
physical recounting of the ballots became the evidence on which the
challenger would base his claim of an irregular canvass. Following this
request, a trial court would permit and oversee a hand recount to collect
evidence of an error. Then, based in part of this evidence, a trial court would
determine whether the challenger succeeded in proving his claim of an
improperly decided election. 91 Thus, by simply claiming a canvassing error
existed, the challenger set off a long chain of events-including a statewide
hand recount-that could not be stopped until a final decision was made. It is
unclear how the opposing party could stop such a process from occurring.
86 Gerry Nelson, Court Orders Andersen Certified as Governor: Order Sets stage
for Recount, WINONA DAILY NEws, Nov. 21, 1962, at 1.
87 Minn. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 209.02 (West 1962).
88 See § 209.02 (West 1962) (not providing terms for an automatic recount).
89 Id. at § 209.02(1) (West 1962).
90 Id at § 209.02(3) (West 1962).
91 § 209.02(5) (West 1962) ("If the contest is brought on the grounds of deliberate,
serious, and material violation of the provisions of the Minnesota Election Law, the
contest shall be commenced in the manner provided in this section."). See also STINNETT,
supra note 5, at 88.
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However, with no automatic recount in place, the law gave the challenger
latitude to demand and receive a recount.
While Rolvaag had ten days to consider his options, he did not wait long
to challenge the canvass's results. On Dec. 3, Rolvaag filed a "notice of
contest" that stated his desire to challenge every precinct in Minnesota.
Essentially Rolvaag, as authorized by statute, demanded a statewide recount.
Stinnett contends the decision to demand a recount in every precinct
surprised Minnesotans, who figured Rolvaag would cherry pick contests. 92
Stinnett argued that recounting the entire state gave legitimacy to the recount,
prevented the DFL from public backlash, reflected an inability to determine
where votes could be found, and, argued least persuasively, reflected
Rolvaag's confidence that he won.93
One of the Minnesota election code's most interesting sections-and the
one that would lead the parties to abandon the statutory litigation process-
concerned which court had jurisdiction over the recount. Minnesota law
provided: "[t]he contestant shall file ... contest ... in any district court of the
state." 94 As the contestant, Rolvaag sought to find the most favorable district
court in the state to oversee the recount and determine him the ultimate
winner.95 Thus, although the recount would occur throughout the state, it
would be presided over by one district court and one judge. Rolvaag
ultimately chose Freeborn County in the Third District. Stinnett contends
Rolvaag chose Freeborn County because it was a Republican-leaning county
and the court's judge, Judge Warren Plunkett, had been appointed to the
bench by a DFL governor. 96 By picking a DFL-leaning judge, Rolvaag
sought to maximize opportunities to gain votes. However, Rolvaag's venue
selection was not guaranteed.
Minnesota's election laws also allowed the trial's location to be changed.
Section 209.03(3) stated: "the place of trial may be changed as in civil
actions." 97 Unsurprisingly, Andersen sought to change venue one day after
Rolvaag contested the election.98 The Republicans sought to change the
recount to Ramsey County, home to the state's capital and a Republican-
friendly judge. However, this motion to change jurisdictions was denied by
92 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 88.
93 Id.
94 § 209.02 (West 1962) (emphasis added).
95 While the court oversaw the recount, it also would determine which votes got
counted and which were excluded.
96 STrNNETT, supra note 5, at 88.
97 § 209.02(2) (West 1962).
98 Please Say It Isn 't True, THE SUNDAY TRIB., Dec. 4, 1962, at 4.
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Judge Plunkett, who sought to preserve the contest in his courtroom. 99 With
this dispute, the change of jurisdiction claim made its way to the Minnesota
Supreme Court. The court decided it would have an oral hearing on
December 10 to determine which venue the recount would occur. Despite
this order, the hearing would never occur and the court would never choose a
venue. In fact, this decision to hear the case would be the last decision the
state's high court would make in this disputed election. The parties would
choose another way to resolve the dispute and avoid returning to the
Minnesota Supreme Court.
V. THE "THIRD" WAY, EMBRACING ADR
Until this point, both parties sought to resolve the election by working
within the election code. However, the events over the weekend of Dec. 7
would signal the parties' and the Minnesota Supreme Court's desire to seek
unconventional remedies to oversee the recount challenge and resolve the
partisan dispute. Ultimately, Andersen and Rolvaag abandoned their
jurisdictional claims and chose a "third" way to resolve their election dispute
by using ADR. The state high court never made another ruling. The third
way was not based on precedent, but rather on the two candidates' interests,
and ultimately restored the public's confidence that the recount would be
handled properly.
On Dec. 7, just three days before the candidates were to make oral
arguments in front of the Minnesota Supreme Court, the candidate's lawyers
and Chief Justice Knutson met to discuss the appeal.'00 While the impetus
for the meeting remains unclear, the meeting ended with the Chief Justice
cancelling the impending oral arguments and both parties stipulating new
procedures to resolve the election.101 Instead of battling over venue, the new
procedures stipulated a three-judge panel to oversee the recount contest in a
neutral setting. Even more significantly, the candidates would pick the judges
who would decide the validity of the recount claim. The mutually agreed
upon three-judge panel was to be picked from a pool of Minnesota's district
court justices.102
Once all parties agreed to these parameters, the Chief Justice allegedly
"locked" Andersen's and Rolvaag's attorneys in a room and forced the two
groups to decide which judges would overhear the case. The parties met all
99 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 90-91.
100 Id. at 95.
101 Id. at 95-98.
102 How the Recount Will be Done, WINONA DAILY NEWS, Dec. 18, 1962, at 9.
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day and whittled a list of fifty-eight prospective district judges to six, then
spent several hours reducing the list to three judges with an alternate.103 As
Stinnett candidly asserts, during the meeting, "each district judge had his
background bared in the bluntest of fashions." 04
Although the origins of the idea to pick three judges cannot be
determined, every party involved has since laid claim to originating it.10
Chief Justice Knutson recounts that he was frustrated with the two parties
and wanted them to find alternative means to end the dispute.10 6 Knutson
recalls telling each party, "This thing has just gone haywire. Nobody's going
to think any of us any good until you lawyers on both sides agree on
[selecting] one judge or three judges." 0 7 He then told both parties to come
up with three candidates and call him when they were done.108 Andersen, in
his autobiography, closely tracks Chief Justice Knutson's recalling of the
events. However, Stinnett asserts that Andersen's attorneys had
"independently" come across a case from Northern Minnesota that used a
three-judge panel.109 Andersen's attorneys planned on raising the idea at the
conference meeting, but were preempted by Rolvaag's attorneys who
brought up the idea instead. Finally, Rolvaag's attorneys, as recalled by
Stinnett, were told that Chief Justice Knutson had allegedly hoped both
parties would avoid the state high court and had wanted the two parties to
choose to use a three-judge panel to decide the case. Because of this
information, Rolvaag's attorneys raised the idea at the conference. 0 That
each party lay claim to the idea represents not only how well regarded the
decision is in hindsight, but also how novel the idea was.
The legal precedent for creating a three-party tribunal and letting the two
parties select the tribunal appears non-existent. While Stinnett asserts
Rolvaag's attorney found a "case" that used a three-judge panel, the case, if it
existed, did not involve a disputed election and certainly did not give both
103 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 95.
104 I
105 Elizabeth Stawicki, The Origin of the Three Judge Panel, MPR NEWS (Jan. 25,
2009), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/01/25/threejudge sidebar/ (last
visited April 15, 2011) (describing the idea's disputed origins).
106 Interview by Marvin Roger Anderson with Oscar R. Knutson, supra note 4, at




109 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 95-96.
110 See also Court Names Panel for Minnesota Recount, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 11,
1962, at A8 (describing how the decision was reached after a series of conferences).
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parties the authority to mutually choose the judges."' Additionally, if
Knutson had the statutory authority to create a three-judge panel, it did not
come from the state's election statutes. 112 A thorough review of Minnesota's
1962 election code does not confer the Chief Justice any authority. A broader
argument could be made that Knutson was using his authority to change
venue-which the Supreme Court was going to do anyway-to pick a three-
judge panel. However, Knutson has not characterized his decision as such. In
fact, Knutson has since asserted that he created the three-judge panel even
though no law justified it.11 3 As a result, it appears that Chief Justice
Knutson broke from his reputation as a strict adherent to precedent"l 4 and
established a new method to resolve the disputed election.
A simpler, though unsubstantiated, explanation may show how the
parties arrived at the idea of mutually selecting a three-judge panel. The
design of the three-judge panel the parties agreed to mimics the statutorily
created "three-person teams" created to resolve contested ballots. 15 These
teams, akin to the three-person teams that stared at chads in Florida's 2000
recount, were a tool used to help identify disputed ballots.11 6 The election
code created these three-person teams to review the ballots.11 7 To determine
who served on the three-person team:
[O]ne [person shall be] selected by each of the parties and a third by those
[two persons selected]. In case either party neglects or refuses to name an
inspector, he shall be named by such judge. 118
Thus, although these three-person review teams served a different
purpose from the panel that would officiate and review the recount, the idea
of a mutually selected three-person group existed in 1962. In fact, the three-
member review teams were commonly used in disputed elections and both
111 This was concluded after searching through a Minnesota's 1962 annotated
statutes, Minnesota reporters, and a failure to find any commentary on the case.
112 See generally § 200-212 (West 1962) (no statute refers to this grant of authority).
113 Interview by Marvin Roger Anderson with Oscar R. Knutson, supra note 5, at
24; Court Names Panel for Minnesota Recount, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 11, 1962, at A8
(granting of authority came after "a number of conferences").
114 Interview by Marvin Roger Anderson with Oscar R. Knutson, supra note 4, at 24
(discussing his preference for following precedent).
115 See infra Section IX.
116 See generally JULIAN M. PLEASANTS, HANGING CHADS: THE INSIDE STORY OF
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL REcOuNT IN FLORIDA (2004).
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candidates had been preparing potential nominees to serve on them. This
points to the idea that the parties conceived of a three-person group to review
a recount and a three-judge tribunal was not entirely novel in its structure.
However, the tribunal was novel in terms of its application and selection
process. Never before had parties opted to forego their venue rights to
resolve an election in a more neutral setting.
Why each party pursued the third way provides further insight as to why
each party readily agreed to an untested and unpredictable dispute resolution
process. The candidate with the least to gain from the tribunal was Andersen,
but Andersen still had a reason to pursue a three-judge tribunal. While
Andersen did win the initial canvass and did want to mitigate Rolvaag's
chances at winning the recount, Stinnett argues that Andersen's team
privately doubted its change of venue argument would succeed in the
Minnesota Supreme Court.119 If the Supreme Court did not change the
venue, a liberal judge would have overseen the recount, which could have
provided an opportunity for Rolvaag to win the recount.
However, should Andersen's team have been worried? Stinnett fails to
demonstrate why the change of venue argument would fail. The Supreme
Court had ruled in Andersen's favor in every previous decision and had
construed vague laws in Andersen's favor. Thus, it was likely the Court
would have supported Andersen's claim for changing venue despite the
public's growing dissatisfaction with the Court. However, Chief Justice
Knutson may have tipped Andersen that such a change of venue would be
unlikely.
Even if the Court declined Andersen's weak venue claim and Andersen
lost the recount, Andersen would have been able to appeal the recount's
unfavorable decision to the Supreme Court. 120 However, for Andersen to
succeed at this stage, the high court would have to find clear error. 121 In
addition, Andersen would also have to hope that public opinion would not
reject a prolonged election by such an appeal. By accepting the panel,
Andersen's attorneys pursued a risk adverse strategy. A recount was going to
occur because Rolvaag had requested one. Andersen was unable to stop the
recount, but could guarantee that the recount would not be presided over by a
DFL-leaning judge. By agreeing to a mutually acceptable panel of judges,
Andersen would not have to rely on a series of unpredictable scenarios or
risk ceding the lead, if only temporarily, to Rolvaag.
119 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 93.
120 § 209.09 (West 1962).
121 Id
425
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Chief Justice Knutson had much to gain by establishing a tribunal. Chief
Justice Knutson admitted to feeling the recount had spun out of control.122
Despite his insistence that the Court never ruled cases in a partisan manner,
the court he presided over had issued two split decisions in the election's
aftermath. 123 Every justice that had been appointed by a Democrat sided with
Rolvaag and every justice appointed by a Republican sided with Andersen.
Furthermore, the justices were widely known to have partisan ideologies,
despite being appointed to their positions. 124 As a result, the local and
national press accused Knutson's court of trying to determine the election's
outcome. 125 All accounts of the election make it clear that Knutson was upset
by these claims.126 By pursuing the three-judge panel, Knutson removed the
Supreme Court from the recount process and shifted the burden to the two
parties to do what others thought Knutson was incapable of: picking fair
judges. Such a decision would likely be important to Knutson, who
personally viewed the state's court as an institution that should not be
consumed with politics.127 In addition, it is conceivable that the tribunal
would change the public's image of Knutson. By creating the tribunal, he
transformed from the being a partisan judge into the election's ultimate
mediator.
For Rolvaag, and his attorneys, a three-judge tribunal was most
beneficial. It would protect two key interests. First, it would assure Rolvaag
that the Minnesota Supreme Court could not change venues to the
Republican-friendly Ramsey County. Second, the move ostensibly removed
the Minnesota Supreme Court from intervening again. While Minnesota's
Election Code allowed the district court's decision on the recount to be
122 Interview by Marvin Roger Anderson with Oscar R. Knutson, supra note 4, at
23.
123 Id
124 See Interview by Marvin Roger Anderson with Oscar R. Knutson, supra note 4.
125 Drew Pearson, Minnesota Supreme Court Under Fire, THE BELL SYNDICATE
(Dec. 7, 1962), available at http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/49639/bl7f23-
1207zdisplay.pdf; Adolphe Johnson, Supreme Court in Spotlight on Vote Recount, THE
SUNDAY TRIB., Dec. 9, 1962, at 1.
126 See, e.g., Elizabeth Stawicki, The Origin of the Three Judge Panel, MPR NEWS
(Jan. 25, 2009),
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/01/25/threejudge_sidebar/ (last visited
Feb. 17, 2012) (describing Knutson as "incensed.").
127 Once Knutson was elevated to the Minnesota Supreme Court, he stopped
attending Republican gatherings and fundraisers. Interview by Marvin Roger Anderson
with Oscar R. Knutson, supra note 4, at 12.
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appealed,128 it would be conceivably difficult for the Supreme Court to
overturn the decision of a tribunal that it authorized and approved. In
addition, provided the tribunal did not incorrectly apply the election law, the
high court would have to find the recount decision was "clear error" to
overturn the district court. If Rolvaag's attorneys thought the court would be
reluctant to change the recount decision, they would be correct. After the
tribunal declared Rolvaag the winner, Chief Justice Knutson responded to an
"informal" query by an Andersen attorney if the Court would consider
overturning the tribunal: 'no, I don't think so-not with those judges."' 29
By pursuing a third way, all parties negotiated a dispute resolution
process that fulfilled their respective interests. Andersen was assured a
moderately fair recount process. Rolvaag removed the Minnesota Supreme
Court from making another decision. Chief Justice Knutson removed the
high court from the recount and any signs of impropriety, but still helped
guide his favored candidate from an unfavorable jurisdictional ruling. A
perfect storm of mutually compatible interests led each party to forego its
preferred course of action for a less predictable, but assuredly beneficial
option. However, this was not done for fairness's sake. Despite history's
attempt to canonize the candidates, they chose this path because it worked for
them. No evidence suggests the candidates chose the mutually selected,
three-judge panel for the sake of creating a fair process.
VII. PICKING THE TRIBUNAL
The concept's goal: an objective and fair tribunal was achieved counter-
intuitively by using a partisan selection process. By design, the tribunal
featured three judges, and each party picked one representative from its own
party. The more difficult process would be selecting a third, and
perceptively, neutral party. In deciding which judges would serve on the
panel, Stinnett colorfully describes the parties' selection process: "each
district judge had his background bared in the bluntest of fashion during
these private conferences." 30 The two parties began with fifty-eight judges
and then quickly shortened their prospective list to six judges. While little is
known about the process, it can be assumed that both parties eliminated the
most partisan judges quickly. Despite this, two of the judges selected still
possessed a relatively clear political leaning. One was the Honorable Sidney
128 Minn. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 209.09 (West 1962).
129 Interview by Marvin Roger Anderson with Oscar R. Knutson, supra note 4, at
24.
130 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 95.
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E. Kaner, who was appointed by a DFL governor, and the other was J. H.
Sylvestre, who was appointed by a Republican governor. The third "neutral"
pick was the Honorable Leonard Keyes, who was appointed to his current
position by a Republican governor, but had been appointed earlier to be a
municipal judge by a DFL governor. Thus, it appears Keyes was considered
a neutral because governors of both parties appointed him to different
positions.
Although both parties appeared preoccupied by the judge's political
leanings and appointments, they seemed unconcerned with the judges'
knowledge of Minnesota election law or judicial experience. Only one judge,
Judge Sylvestre, had experience in overseeing disputed elections.131 The
"neutral" judge, Judge Keyes, had never adjudicated an election dispute
before. In fact, Keyes stated that after he was appointed, "I began by reading
every decision I could find in the State of Minnesota relative to decisions by
our Supreme Court in regard to election contests. That was about all I could
do at that point. I had no prior experience." 32 Keyes's selection also is
confounding in terms of his experience. He was a new and untested district
court judge; having been elevated to the bench just two years earlier.
Entering the recount, both parties were still motivated by partisanship and
tied their candidate's political fate to judges that had little knowledge of the
process. This further illuminates the candidates' political interests for the
tribunal. They were not concerned about finding experienced judges but
wanted ones who could perceivably side with either candidate or, with
respect to Keyes, who was no more biased against their own side than the
other side.
After the parties had selected the judges, Chief Justice Knutson approved
them and made a telephone call to conscript the judges into service. 133 As
Knutson recalled, none of the judges wanted the job, as revealed by a
conversation with Sylvestre: "'Well Oscar, I don't suppose I have any
choice.' [Knutson replying] 'well, no you don't have any choice"'l 34 All
three of the judges expressed a disinterest in serving because of the perceived
partisanship of previous decisions. 135 All three judges further testified that
they were committed to perceiving the integrity and fairness of the process.
131 Interview by Ronald Stinnett with Judge J.H. Sylvestre and Judge Leonard J.
Keyes, (Aug. 5, 1963) in RECOUNT 205 (1963).
132 Id. at 205.
133 See, e.g., id. at 204.
134 Id.




LETTING THE CANDIDATES OWN THE RECOUNT
As Keyes recalled, "[T]he preservation of the of the integrity of the judicial
process in the State of Minnesota was the most important function that we
had; and... if that were maintained by our three-judge panel, a fair result
would necessarily follow."1 36
Feeding into this sense of fairness was the public's reaction to the three-
person tribunal. Stinnett stated, "For the first time since election day, some
orderly, fair, and just procedure for the recount had been pounded out by
both parties." 37 Knutson, now removed from the process, stated in a press
release, "The task of completing the recount may now proceed expeditiously,
as it should, to the end that it fairly may be determined which candidatefairly
received the most legal votes." 38 The local press praised the idea as an
amicable decision and expressed hope that the process would proceed
fairly.139 By resorting to unusual means, Minnesota had restored confidence
that a fair process could be established. However, few could have predicted
how transparently the process would proceed.
VIII. THE TRIBUNAL
Upon creating the tribunal, Rolvaag's counsel and Andersen's counsel
faced a long procedural battle. By law, the judges would not decide if the
recount challenge was successful until after the ballots had been reexamined.
To reexamine the ballots, the judges were required to appoint three-person
teams. 140 These teams would review the ballots, determine if there were any
errors, and submit their findings back to the court. The three-judge panel
would then review the findings from the teams and hear any independent
complaints of an improper election. Once this was completed, the judges
would issue their final ruling on the recount. Only at this stage would the
court determine if Rolvaag's claim of canvassing irregularities was justified.
However, nothing could stop the recount process from occurring.
It is important to note two things. First, Andersen could not contest the
validity of Rolvaag's claims once the tribunal was created. The tribunal's
role, as the overseer of the recount, was to determine the merits of Rolvaag's
136 Interview by Ronald Stinnett with Judge J.H. Sylvestre and Judge Leonard J.
Keyes, (Aug. 5, 1963) in RECOUNT 207 (1963).
137 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 97.
138 Id. (emphasis added). No formal order appointing the judges could be found.
However, such orders-if they exist-may be available at the Minnesota Historical
Society archive.
139 Panel of Three Judges to Handle Recount. FERGUS FALLS DALY J., Dec. 10,
1962, at 1 ("an amicable agreement has been reached.").
140 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 100-03.
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canvassing claim after the hand recount was conducted. Only after the
recount, could the court grant its final decision. Second, and relatedly,
Rolvaag did not have to demonstrate to the tribunal why he wanted a
statewide recount, nor did he have to demonstrate the bases for a recount
beyond its initial requests.
The parties' first task was to create the three-person review teams that
would allow for the hand recount to begin. 141 Like the process to pick the
three-judge panel, the standards were created behind closed doors. However,
the parties mutually agreed on how they would select teams. The teams
would consist of a perceived neutral auditor, a perceived DFLer auditor, and
a perceived Republican auditor.142 In an effort to determine what constituted
a real vote, all three parties agreed to unified procedural rules overseeing the
count. The initial standards did not address what constituted a valid vote, but
allowed each team of reviewers to determine if a disputed ballot existed. The
parties did establish objective rules for checking the number of ballots cast
against the total number of registered person that reportedly voted.143 This
initial physical recount would continue from Dec. 17, 1962 until Jan. 9,
1963.144
On Jan. 21, the three-judge panel began its first public hearing. The trial
would be divided into two distinct parts. The first part discussed charges of
irregularities in the conduct of the election. This involved allegations of fraud
or other election irregularities and was independent of the physical recount
being conducted. The second part discussed charges of canvassing
irregularities and dealt directly with the hand recount.
In the first phase, concerning only conduct irregularities, only Rolvaag
made any claims of improprieties. As the candidate that was behind, it made
sense that Rolvaag sought to challenge as many votes possible by charging
irregularities. Rolvaag's five charges asserted that ballots were not sent
properly through the mail, that absentee voting requirements were not met,
that an election official bribed or coerced thirty voters at a nursing home, and
that officials had stuffed votes. 145
Andersen's failure to make any claims of any fraud and Rolvaag's
limited claims of fraud may indicate how free of fraud the original election
had been. In fact, if the court accepted all five of Rolvaag's election
irregularity claims, Rolvaag would only gain a net 150 votes. While this
141 Id. at 117.
142 See id. at 105-06.
143 Id. at 107.
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would be enough to swing the election, it would not create a dramatic
reversal of fortune for either party. Because the second phase could involve
thousands of ballots, the results from this phase were not viewed as decisive.
Ultimately, the court unanimously rejected four of Rolvaag's five
claims.146 Rolvaag's one successful claim emerged from Elbow Lake
Village. Rolvaag successfully persuaded the court that thirty-one votes,
which had not been sent by mail, constituted a material irregularity.147 The
judges found an irregularity because the county auditor-who also was
running for political office-delivered the votes to the polling place.148 As a
result, Rolvaag netted ten votes after all thirty-one votes had been removed
from the vote count. 149 Stinnett argues this decision-the only finding of
fraud-was significant because it demonstrated that the election was
practically free of fraud.'50 From Stinnett's perspective, only discounting
thirty-one votes, based on an isolated irregularity, served to allay concerns
that the election had been fixed by either party.151 However, the decision to
reject the thirty-one ballots becomes more significant when considered for
other reasons.
By deciding not to count the Elbow Lake Village votes, the court had
effectively disagreed the Minnesota Supreme Court's earlier decision to
count the same thirty-one votes in the initial count. Thus a unanimous three-
judge panel-appointed by the Minnesota Supreme Court-had found an
irregularity that a split Minnesota Supreme Court ordered to include several
months earlier.
By excluding these votes, the tribunal implicitly asserted its
independence from a perceptively partisan high court, demonstrated its desire
to reach unified decisions, and affirmed its willingness to make a
controversial decision. While one could argue that the thirty-one votes did
constitute an egregious voting error because they were hand delivered by a
candidate for office, the tribunal's decision made a difficult move of
distancing itself from the Supreme Court; asserting the tribunal's unique
autonomy. Additionally, by deciding the issue unanimously, the judges'
decision seemed unaffected by politics and thus gained a sense of legitimacy
146 See STINNETT, supra note 5, at 131-139 (describing the claims and supesequent
results).
147 See id.
148 Id. at 138.
14 9 Id
15 0 Id. at 139.
151 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 137-39.
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that the Minnesota Supreme Court's fractured decisions never achieved. 152
The significance of this ruling may have been lost at the time to Stinnett and
others, but this decision reflects a unique, if not unparalleled, result in a
disputed election. A unanimous three-judge tribunal made a decision that
seemed to transcend perceptions of impropriety.
IX. PHASE Two: BALLOT IRREGULARITIES
On Feb. 25, 1963, more than three months after the election, the second
part of the trial, which would review the recounted ballots, formally
began. 153 However, aside from judges wearing black robes, few would be
able to describe the trial as a typical courtroom setting. File cabinets,
containing thousands of disputed ballots, lined the courtroom's back wall.154
The judges sat in a jury box because the judge's raised bench could not
accommodate all of the judges. This impromptu design removed the judges
from their lofty perch and placed them at the same level as the candidates'
attorneys. Finally, instead of sitting at two separate tables, the two parties sat
across from each other on an elongated table. 155 With the two parties at the
same table and the judges sitting across from them, the trial had to appear
more like a conference or negotiation than a formal trial. In this sense, the
court's appearance matched the form the disputed election had taken.
While phase two formally began on Feb. 25, the two parties had prepared
extensively for the case by "collecting evidence" through the hand recount.
Each party identified disputed ballots that it wished to contest in front of the
three-judge panel.156 This process-determining whether someone cast a real
vote-mirrored the disputed election's evolution: at first, identifying the
process was partisan. Each party attempted to contest each ballot. This was
replaced, over time, by a collaborative model that placed more responsibility
on the parties to resolve the election.
At first, both parties sought to amass as many challenged ballots as
possible. Stinnett describes how both parties sought to train workers who
could quickly spot a wide variety of irregular markings on a ballot.157 Both
152 Interview by Ronald Stinnett with Judge J.H. Sylvestre and Judge Leonard J.
Keyes, (Aug. 5, 1963) in RECOUNT 211 (1963) (discussing how each decision was made
unanimously).




157 Id. at 122-25.
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parties repeated a mantra: Never challenge [your candidate's] ballot. If in
doubt--challenge [the opposing candidate's] ballot.158
When this process had concluded, the parties had reviewed more than
770,000 paper ballots. The parties contested approximately 98,000 ballots, or
more than 12% of the total reviewed. For the recount to be completed, every
ballot would have to be analyzed by the three-judge tribunal.
Recognizing the difficulty in reviewing such a large number of ballots,
the court issued an order on Dec. 21, 1962 for "Screening of Proposed
Evidence."159 However, aside from making the order, the court played no
role in reviewing or screening the evidence. Instead, each party had two
representatives act as conciliators to review the ballots at issue. Both parties
removed ballots that contained no dispute and kept those that they deemed
controversial. The tit-for-tat process succeeded only as much as each party
was willing to cooperate. By the end of the process, the parties had reduced
the contested ballots by 75,000 votes to 22,000 disputed ballots.160
To further reduce the number of contested votes, the tribunal next asked
the two parties to categorize the contested ballots into twenty-four categories
of possible errors. Examples included double votes, no votes, and incorrect
voting standards. By requiring the parties to identify each ballot's problems,
the two parties reduced the number of contested ballots to 3,851 ballots.
Recognizing the need for a more manageable pool, the two parties again-by
their own decision-reduced the number of contested ballots to 1,192.161
Stinnett succinctly summarizes the process of reviewing the contested
ballots adopted by the panel.162 For each of the twenty-four categories, both
parties would assert the standard they wanted to use and whether each
contested ballot should or should not be counted. The judges then decided
whether to accept or reject each ballot. For example, Category No. 3
concerned claims that the ballots did not contain a vote for any gubernatorial
candidate.163 On fifty-five ballots, one of the parties claimed a vote existed,
while the other claimed no vote existed. Rolvaag asserted 23 "no vote"
ballots actually contained a vote for Rolvaag.164 The court concluded that
nine ballots did vote for him, while 14 were truly a "no vote."1 65 Andersen
158 Id at 102.
159 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 122.
160 Id at 130.
161 Id at 150.
162 Id at 143-44.
163 Id. at 143.
164 See Appendix I.
165 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 143.
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asserted 32 "no vote" ballots actually voted for Andersen.166 The court
counted nine of his ballots, but rejected 23.167 After the end of this Rolvaag
picked up nine contested ballots.16 8
The recount is significant for two interrelated reasons: (1) how the judges
transferred control of the process back to the parties and (2) how much the
two parties resolved the dispute. When both parties initiated the recount, they
sought to maximize the number of disputed ballots. However, the three-judge
tribunal repeatedly required the parties to reduce the number of challenged
ballots. This in turn required the parties to resolve most of the contested
ballots and leave only the most controversial ballots for the judges to review.
In the end, the judges reviewed 1.6% of the originally challenged ballots.
Again, the judicial system allowed the parties to use an overtly partisan
process to focus the recount to its most meaningful core set of contested
ballots.
By reducing the number of challenged ballots to such a small number,
the three-judge tribunal implicitly made the parties resolve their own
disputed election. By the time the judges reviewed the remaining ballots, it
became statistically difficult for the court to change the election's results. For
Andersen to overcome his deficit, he needed to gain 150 votes from a pool of
1,192 contested ballots. Thus, Andersen had to pick up or Rolvaag had to
lose over 12% of the remaining votes. In an election that had been decided by
.16%, it required Andersen to overcome an extremely high hurdle. However,
Andersen found himself in such a situation because he stipulated that the
other ballots were not contestable. Essentially the process, and not the
candidates, determined that the winner.
X. THE DECISION AND REACTION
The three-judge panel issued its decision on March 21, 1963. The court
announced that Rolvaag won by 89 votes. 169 In a memo, the court noted that
"there was abundant and conclusive evidence that numerous mistakes and
inaccuracies existed in the original canvass of the votes," however the court
concluded the decision was final and very clear. 170 The court made clear how
much the two parties contributed: "Each of the parties fully participated at
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 153. See Appendix I for a breakdown of the twenty-four categories.
169 See Andersen Calls Press Conference for 2 P.M, FERGUs FALLS DAILY J., Mar.
26, 1963, at 1.
170 STINNETT, supra note 5, at 192.
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every stage of the entire proceedings and each fully protected his rights."' 7 '
In addition, the court made a point to note that the two parties had selected
the inspectors that conducted the recount. 172
Andersen had the opportunity to appeal. By law, he was granted the
opportunity to challenge the recount's results to the Minnesota Supreme
Court.'7 3 In theory, such a decision would seem attractive. The court's
previous decisions all favored Andersen. In addition, the three-judge tribunal
had implicitly overturned one of the high court's decisions in the trial's first
phase. Thus it would seem likely that if the court were to review the case,
Andersen could recapture votes. More significantly, Andersen had been
declared the winner of the first recount and lost the second recount by less
than 150 votes. In this way, the tribunal had not affirmed the results of the
first election.
However, Andersen chose not to appeal. Publicly, Andersen indicated
that he would spend several days considering an appeal. Andersen, in his
autobiography, contends that he never really considered such an action. "The
ultimate decision was mine. For me it could turn only on one thing: my
judgment of what was best for Minnesota," he wrote. 174 Such a remembrance
fits well with remembering the disputed election as a shared, nonpartisan
process.
Andersen did consider appealing, though. Andersen, in his
autobiography, asserted that the tribunal properly decided questions of fact
and that his attorneys told him, "there were no errors of law on which to base
a Supreme Court appeal." 75 He needed a finding of clear error and this was
unlikely. Despite this, several advisors strongly urged him to appeal.176 in
addition, one of Andersen's lawyers called Chief Justice Knutson and asked
about the finality of the three-judge tribunal's decision. The Chief Justice
replied, "no, I don't think [there is any chance we would reverse the court]-
not with those judges. We lost then."' 77 This conversation not only reveals
Knutson's partisan views of the election, but also his desire to stay out of
resolving the election again. Knutson, like others, wanted to see the dispute




174 A MAN's REACH,supra note 8, at 254.
175 Id.
176 Id; STINNETT, supra note 5, at 192-93.
177 Interview by Marvin Roger Anderson with Oscar R. Knutson, supra note 4, at
24.
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Historians have pointed to several manifest reasons why Andersen-who
had won the initial canvass-so easily accepted a recount in which he lost by
142 votes. Stinnett argues that another recount would have been prohibitively
costly. 7 8 However, cost has rarely, if ever, been a reason to avoid
conducting a recount. Time might have also been a factor. The election had
dragged on for months and the new governor's term was already several
months old. Minnesotans wanted the election to be over, regardless of the
outcome. As one voter indicated, she did not care who won, but she just
wanted to stop hearing about the recount.179 Finally, a newspaper account
attributed the three-judge tribunal's forceful decision as to why he did not
pursue a recount: "The strongly worded order of the three-judge recount
count ... may have considerable to do with heading off an appeal." 80 While
such factors contributed to Andersen's decision, his decision can be
explained through more latent circumstances.
Aside from the public reasons to not challenge the results, Andersen had
very little reason to do it. He and Rolvaag effectively administered their
entire disputed election process, and as a result he had to accept it. In the
absence of clear guidelines, both parties picked the judges to oversee the
debate, both agreed to a recount process, and, most importantly, both decided
which votes to challenge and which votes to accept. In the end, the only thing
the three-judge panel decided was whether to count the ballots. The process
was uniform and the decisions came from one court: a court they had both
agreed upon, and a court that issued unanimous decisions.
In the face of such conditions, the Mayor of St. Paul, a fellow
Republican, urged Andersen not to appeal: "An appeal by you to the
[Minnesota] Supreme Court would create undue hardship on the people of
Minnesota as well as to place our court systems in the political arena." 81 To
do so would reawaken memories of a politically motivated court, and any
result reached would taint any potential Andersen victory. Finally, to have
the court review the decision, Andersen would have to prove the three-judge
tribunal's findings constituted clear error. This would be hard considering his
involvement in establishing and participating in the recount. With such
control over the nonpartisan recount process, Andersen could not fault
178 Id. at 106-07; Recount Costs, CHI. TRIB. Mar. 25, 1963, at 20.
179 See Minnesota Historical Society, 1963 Andersen-Rolvaag Election Recount
(Podcast), http://discussions.mnhs.org/collections/2010/11/1963-andersen-rolvaag-
election-recount-2/ (last visited April 6, 2011).
180 Andersen Calls Press Conference for 2 P.M, FERGUs FALLS DAILY J. (Mar. 26,
1963), at 1.
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partisan judges, an inability to count invalid votes, or claim election fraud.
He implicitly recognized this when he said after conceding:
When a competent and fair trial, which the district judge panel must
certainly has been, renders a judgment that skilled representatives of mine
feel cannot be successfully challenged in a higher court, then no one could
expect me to appeal in order to gain time or possession to the last possible
moment. 182
There was little reason for him to challenge the outcome.
Finally, public sentiment supported the results as fair and correct. While
many complained about the duration of the recount trial, there was a strong
sense that the process had been fair. An Ohio newspaper allegedly wrote that
Minnesota had figured out a fair way to resolve disputed election.183 Stinnett
characterized the recount as impressive in Minnesota's "unquestioning resort
to the judicial processes for a solution to the [election's] impasse."' 84 An
Atlanta Journal Constitution editorial joked that it was the candidates' calm
disposition that allowed the courts to do decide the process so fairly. Unlike
other disputed elections that turned into metaphorical wars, this process
seemed far more civil, shared, and authoritative. 185 An election that had been
criticized for months for being partisan and divisive had evolved into a long,
but fair, process.
XI. MEMORY OF THE RECOUNT
Over time, the recount has ebbed and flowed from the memory of
Minnesotans. However, the 2008 Minnesota senatorial election between
Norm Coleman and Al Franken featured another extremely close race and
resulted in a fiercely contested recount.186 Prior to the Coleman-Franken
recount, the 1962 election was remembered for being exceedingly close and
exceptionally long. Chief Justice Knutson heralded his "decision" to create a
182 Gov. Andersen Quits in Favor of Rolvaag, THE SUNDAY TRIfB., Mar. 24, 1963, at
1.
183 Id. (referencing vaguely an Ohio newspaper that stated this). This source could
not be located after an extensive search.
184 STINNETT,supra note 5, at 194.
185 Id.; see also STINNETr, supra note 5, at 198 (referring to the process as "creative,
cordial and judicial.")
186 See, e.g., JAY WEINER, THIS Is NOT FLORIDA: How AL FRANKEN WON THE
MINNESOTA RECOUNT (2010).
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three-judge panel as the crowning achievement of his tenure on the bench. 187
As other elections failed to be resolved fairly, Minnesota's 1962 election had
been characterized as the civil exception to the rule. Andersen, the loser, has
commended the process in his autobiography, although he tries to assert that
no candidate ever sought to win by resorting to partisan tactics.' 8 8
In the wake of the Coleman-Franken election, the 1962 election was re-
examined for its results.899 Most recalled the election as a unique story that
produced a close result, but did not explore the process involved.190 in
contrast to this, Ned Foley argued that the 1962 three-judge panel provided a
path for Coleman and Franken to follow. 191 However, Minnesotans seemed
reluctant to believe their judicial system was incapable of producing an
unbiased result. One Minnesotan expressed his disgust that Foley would
insinuate that a panel of judges was necessary and that it was ridiculous that
a judge could not decide an election fairly and objectively.192 By the end of
the Coleman-Franken recount, the author of the response may have felt
differently about not needing a three-judge panel. The Coleman-Franken
recount ended acrimoniously.193
XII. CONCLUSION
The 1962 Minnesota recount is significant for two reasons: the process
the parties created, and the result it achieved. In regard to the former, it is
significant to note that the parties-despite diametrically opposed interests-
were able to come together develop their own dispute resolution process.
187 Interview by Marvin Roger Anderson with Oscar R. Knutson, supra note 4
(stating his decision to create the three-judge tribunal as one of his most important
decision as Chief Justice).
188 A MAN'S REACH, supra note 8, at 254.
189 See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Settling Coleman-Franken Contest: Lessons From
the 1962-63 Recount, MINNPOsT.COM (Jan. 8, 2009),
http://www.minnpost.com/communityvoices/2009/01/08/5684/settlingcoleman-
franken contest lessons from_1962-63 recount (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
190 Elizabeth Stawicki, The Origin of the Three-Judge Panel, MPR NEWS (Jan. 25,
2009), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/01/25/threejudge sidebar/ (last
visited Feb. 17, 2012).
191 Edward B. Foley, Settling Coleman-Franken Contest: Lessons from the 1962-63
Recount, MINNPosT.COM (Jan. 8, 2009),
http://www.minnpost.com/community voices/2009/01/08/5684/settling coleman-
franken contestlessons from 1962-63 recount (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
192 ]d
193 See WEINER, supra note 187.
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While it is beyond the scope of this recent development article to classify
alternative dispute resolution processes used, it is significant to understand
that the parties created their own way to resolve the dispute. As has been
explained, Rolvaag and Andersen did not pursue the panel for idealistic
reasons; they pursued it because they thought they could win.
It is also significant to understand what the 1962 recount achieved. In the
end, the candidates, Minnesotans, and the press agreed that the election had
ended fairly. This is especially incredible because a different candidate was
declared the winner three times. First, Rolvaag won the initial canvass.
Second, the State Canvassing Board and the Minnesota Supreme Court
certified Andersen the winner. Third, the three-judge tribunal declared
Rolvaag the winner of the recount. Because of this, the 1962 election
provided a strong opportunity for either candidate or the press to be upset
with the process. However, no one voiced concerns. By giving the two
parties ownership of the process, the recount achieved a high sense of
legitimacy. While the parties may have been unhappy with the results, they
picked the judges, oversaw the recounting of ballots, and determined what
could or could not be challenged.
The question becomes how could such an ADR influenced recount occur
again. Rather then making the alternative dispute resolution process available
to consenting parties, as was the case in the 1962 Minnesota recount, states
would be wise to make the candidate-selecting, three-judge tribunal the
primary way to resolve the dispute. A possible statute would involve the
following characteristics: In the period before the election, both parties can
meet to discuss which judges would oversee the recount or resolve claims of
fraud. To ensure the candidates mutually select a three-judge panel, the
statute could further stipulate that if the parties fail to select a three-judge
panel, the judges would be assigned by lottery. By having the parties select
the judges or having a judge assigned randomly, the courts would avoid any
appearance of impropriety. Finally, the statute should make the three-judge
panel's decision final. By eliminating an appeal, the statute would ensure a
partial court would not review the matter.
As was demonstrated in Minnesota, if the process works, the parties
should not feel the need to appeal: they appointed their own judges and
controlled the recount's course. This fits one of the primary benefits of using
ADR to resolve disputes: allowing parties to control the ways in which they
resolve their disputes. Such a proposal serves as a starting point to consider
new ways for legislatures to create statutes that resolve disputed elections.
While such a process would need further research, it supports Minnesota's
1962 lesson: make the candidates own the recount.
Brian DeSantis
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Appendix I: Recount Categories
Categories developed by the three-judge panel to review disputed ballots
Category Type of Ballot Issue Total in Total Net votes
Category Stipulated/ (from
Debated category)
1 Double Votes 386 363/23 +10
Rolvaag
2 Double Votes 39 26/13 +2
Andersen
3 "no vote" 71 16/55 +9
Rolvaag
4 Equivocal Votes 165 111/54 +14
Rolvaag
5 Surplus Voting 114 108/6 +1
Rolvaag
6 Attempted 152 89/63 +1
Obliteration/Erasure Rolvaag
7 Unusual Voting Marks 426 319/107 +3
Andersen
8 Surplus Marks for Governor 147 141/6 +2
Alone Andersen
9 Containing Misplaced Marks 28 25/3 +1
in Votes for Governor Andersen
10 Non-Uniform Marks 928 0/928 +36
Rolvaag
11 Combinations of Complete 98 54/44 +4
and Partial Voting Marks Andersen
12 Unusual Voting Marks for 91 73/18 +2
Offices Other than Governor Rolvaag
13 Ballots with Unusual but 31 22/9 +0
Uniform Voting Marks
14 Inconsistent Arrangement of 196 194/2 +0
Voting Marks
15 Surplus or Unnecessary 619 594/25 +1
Voting Marks in Candidate Andersen
Area
16 Names/Initials on Ballot 76 70/6 +1
Rolvaag
17 Possible Write-In Votes that 34 29/5 +1
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18 Other Distinguishing Marks 12 0/12 +0
Outside the Candidate Areas
19 Ballots With Numbers On 1 0/1 +0
20 Unusual Obliterations 1 0/1 +0
21 Stipulated Out
22 Miscellaneous 31 8/23 +2
Andersen
23 Holding Miscellaneous 15 6/9 +3
Rolvaag
24 Spoiled Ballots 5 5/0 +2
Rolvaag
25 Ballots (not Absentee) 64 0/65 +20
Claimed to be Valid, but Not Rolvaag
in Recount
26 Absentee Ballots Claimed to 21 0/21 +5
be Valid, but Not Included Rolvaag
27 Miscellaneous Ballot Included 2 0/2 +2
in Recount Rolvaag
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